A Dialogue with Arne Naess on Social Ecology and Deep Ecology (1988-1997) by Clark, John P.




In the spring of 1987, Donald Davis, an environmental sociologist at the 
University of Tennessee arranged a talk there by Murray Bookchin. At the 
time, I was working very closely with Bookchin, and I went there to meet 
with him and Davis, who had been a student and staff member at the 
Institute for Social Ecology. During the visit, Bookchin showed me the proofs 
for an article entitled “Thinking Ecologically: A Dialectical Approach,” a 
large part of which was an attack on deep ecology, systems theory, Asian 
thought, and the radical environmental organization Earth First! 
I was disturbed by what I read. I found it to be seriously lacking in careful 
analysis or nuance, and often to be unfair to the objects of attack.  I suggested 
that he rewrite it, making sure that he did not over-generalize or 
misrepresent any positions.  He replied, rather unconvincingly, that it was 
too late to make any changes, and he did not respond in any way to the 
content of my suggestions.1 
What I did not know at the time was that he had recently written a much 
more extreme attack on deep ecology, in which he had parodied, and, indeed, 
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1  Later that Summer, I wrote to Gary Snyder that I was very troubled by the 
direction of Bookchin’s thinking and actions, referring to “a very disturbing 
development that became apparent this summer at the Social Ecology Institute.” I 
noted Bookchin’s increasingly antagonistic and “polarizing” stance toward other 
ecological activists and theorists. I mentioned in particular his hostility to Deep 
Ecology and Earth First!, and note that we continued to debate Daoist philosophy 
but that “I now find that his mind is closed on the matter ,” and “he makes 
dogmatic and ill-informed generalizations.” Finally I lamented the fact that he 
seemed to be presenting me “the dilemma of [either] becoming an abject ‘follower’ 
or being rejected,” and deplored the emergence of such “destructive conflicts within 
the still rather small ecological and Green tendencies in this country.”
demonized it to an extraordinary degree. The War of the Ecologies had 
begun.
The article in question was called “Social Ecology versus Deep Ecology: A 
Challenge for the Ecology Movement.”2  It is noteworthy that although this 
article is one of the more analytically weak and theoretically inept efforts in 
the literature of environmental philosophy, it is the single text representing 
the position of social ecology that has been most widely reprinted. Not only 
has it appeared in various ecological and political publications, and in a 
collection on deep ecology, it has also been included in a number of 
environmental ethics texts.”3!
In this notorious article, Bookchin refers to “a vague, formless, often self-
contradictory, and invertebrate thing called deep ecology” that has  
“parachuted into our midst quite recently from the Sunbelt's bizarre mix of 
Hollywood and Disneyland, spiced with homilies from Taoism, Buddhism, 
spiritualism, reborn Christianity, and in some cases eco-fascism.” In addition 
to depicting deep ecology as such an invertebrate, parachuting, spiced thing, 
he accuses it of “preach[ing] a gospel of a kind of ‘original sin’ that accurses a 
vague species called humanity...which it sees as an ugly ‘anthropocentric’ 
thing---presumably a malignant product of natural evolution---that is 
‘overpopulating’ the planet, ‘devouring’ its resources, and destroying its 
wildlife and the biosphere...” He indicts deep ecologists such as Dave 
Foreman, who “preach a gospel that humanity is some kind of cancer in the 
world of life.” !
Moving on to guilt by association, he observes that “it was out of this kind of 
crude eco-brutalism that Hitler, in the name of ‘population control,’ with a 
racial orientation, fashioned theories of blood and soil that led to the 
transport of millions of people to murder camps like Auschwitz.” He says 
that “the same [sic] eco-brutalism now reappears a half-century later among 
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2  Murray Bookchin, “Social Ecology versus Deep Ecology: A Challenge for the 
Ecology Movement.” Green Perspectives: Newsletter of the Green Program Project, nos. 
4-5 (summer 1987)
3 For example, those of Desjardins, Schmidtz and Willott, and Pojman and Pojman.
self-professed deep ecologists who believe that Third World peoples should 
be permitted to starve to death and that desperate Indian immigrants from 
Latin America should be excluded by the border cops from the United States 
lest they burden ‘our’ ecological resources.”  He concludes that deep ecology 
is “a black hole of half-digested, ill-formed, and half-baked ideas” that lies at 
“the depths of an ideological toxic dump.” 
Arne Naess, as the foremost philosopher of deep ecology, is not spared 
Bookchin’s wrath. He calls Naess “the pontiff of deep ecology,” implying that 
Naess claimed some kind of dogmatic authority over the movement. He also 
condemns Naess for his connection decades earlier with logical positivism, 
claiming that he was “an acolyte of this repellent school of thought for 
years.” 
The Dialogue
The following year, in October of 1988, I received a brief note from Arne 
Naess asking for a copy of an article that I had written on Daoism and 
politics. In addition, he commented, “I read your article in The Trumpeter 
with pleasure!”4  
The article, entitled “What is Social Ecology?” was written as the 
introduction for a collection I edited entitled Renewing the Earth: The 
Promise of Social Ecology.5 It generally follows Bookchin’s interpretation of 
social ecology but also contains evidence of the divergent directions that 
Bookchin and I were soon to take. I describe social ecology as “a 
comprehensive holistic conception of the self, society and nature” that is 
based on the “ecological principle of organic unity-in-diversity” and which 
“rejects the dualism that has plagued Western civilization since its 
beginnings.” I repeat Bookchin’s ideas about evolution being a process 
“having directiveness and involving the progressive unfolding of 
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4 "What Is Social Ecology?" in The Trumpeter: Journal of Ecosophy 5 (Spring 1988): 72- 
75.
5 John Clark, ed. Renewing the Earth: The Promise of Social Ecology (London: Merlin 
Press GreenPrint, 1990).
potentiality” and tie this concept to teleological philosophical traditions.6 I 
also link such ideas to the Daoist concept of Dao as the path of unfolding of a 
being, a connection that would later be harshly attacked by Bookchin.
Interestingly, I disassociate social ecology from both anthropocentrism and 
biocentrism, calling it an “ecocentrism, in the sense that it requires humanity 
to situate its good within the larger context of the planetary good, and to 
transform our often narrow rationality into truly planetary reason.”  I say 
that this is interesting because Bookchin would later attack ecocentrism, 
while some deep ecologists, for example George Sessions, would attack me 
for defending anthropocentrism and rejecting ecocentrism.7
Naess did not explain what he liked about the article, but I assume that he 
appreciated it as a synthesis of the general perspective of social ecology with 
concepts that have affinities with deep ecology.
In December of 1988, Naess sent me a brief letter thanking me for various 
articles I sent him. He comments with surprising optimism, “I am now 
completely relaxed about social ecology/deep ecology.  In the long run only 
joy will come out of the relation.” Later in December, he sent me a longer 
letter in which he begins by thanking me for a recent letter I had sent him, 
and commenting that “It will not be difficult for us to discuss.” He continues 
(rather surprisingly, considering the date) by disassociating himself from a 
concept that has caused much controversy in ecophilosophy, that of 
“biospheric egalitarianism.” This is particularly noteworthy because it is one 
of the seven characteristics of deep ecology that he discussed in the original 
deep and shallow ecology article.8 Many sources (for example, The 
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6 I note that Bookchin rejected the term “teleology” because of his (in fact fallacious) 
association of the term with determinism.
7  Later I rejected the term, since I began to question any idea of “centrism.” I 
continued to accept the principles I had associated with it, but which I came to 
believe were more adequately conveyed by the non-neologism “ecological.”  
8  Arne Naess, “The Shallow and the Deep, Long-Range Ecology Movement: A 
Summary” in Inquiry 16 (1973): 95-100.
Encyclopedia of Religion and Nature9) still include the term in descriptions of 
his ecophilosophy. Actually, he had begun to question the concept at least as 
early as the 1984 article “Intuition, Intrinsic Value, and Deep Ecology,”10 in 
which he wonders whether the concept might be doing more harm than 
good.  
In the letter, he says, more decisively, that:
I do not like the term “egalitarianism in the biosphere” any 
more.  I reject the idea of equality as used for what I call a 
right to live and blossom. “There is a right that all living 
beings have, the right to live and blossom.” The rights of 
one of these beings are not equal to the right of any other, 
nor not equal.  The quantitative or topological relationship 
is misplaced. The right is the same. It is the same right they 
all have. Similarly, there is an intrinsic value or worth of 
which one may validly say that it [is] common to all living 
beings - as such.  It is inherent in their status of living 
beings, and is independent of any relation to usefulness or 
to the classification of higher or lower development. If I in a 
provoked mood kill a mosquito I do not consider justifying 
this by reference to any higher intrinsic value of humans. 
But I certainly would somehow justify killing any kind of 
animal in certain kinds of situations.  Very complicated 
norms are involved!  There may be intrinsic values which 
humans realize and are unrealizable by animals.  I do not 
talk about that.
Naess’s position on this key issue was clearly evolving, and it has often been 
noted that he progressively qualified and weakened the moral implication of 
the concept. Yet, there seems still to be a fundamental ambiguity that needs 
to be resolved. What is the status of the “equal rights” that are still attributed 
to beings? And under what conditions should such rights be overridden? 
Later letters pursue these questions.
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9 “Arne Naess” in Bron Taylor, ed., The Encyclopedia of Religion and Nature (New York 
and London: Continuum, 2008), pp. 1149-1150.
10 Arne Naess, “Intuition, Intrinsic Value, and Deep Ecology” in The Ecologist, Vol. 14 
No. 5/6, (1984): 201.
Naess’s next letter, of July 11, 1993, is one of the most interesting. In it, he 
addresses three important topics: 1) the level of generality at which social 
ecology should be looked upon as an ecophilosophy; 2) the degree to which 
social ecology engages in specific social and ecological analysis; and 3) the 
importance of community.   
He begins by observing:
A week ago I left for the mountains with Renewing the Earth: 
The Promise of Social Ecology intending to go through the 
book carefully and write an article stressing positive aspects. 
Now 4 days are gone and I am gradually losing ground.  I 
am more confused about the central issues dealt with in the 
book than I was when I started reading a week ago. Your 
article at the head of the book I understand and appreciate. 
The first sentences make me believe that social ecology is an 
ecosophy in my sense, a total view in part inspired and 
motivated by the (increasing) ecological crisis. But: Is “social 
ecology” a name of one ecosophy or a class with basic 
common characteristics? I hope it is meant as a class-name, 
otherwise a Gleichschaltung [enforced conformity] is implied 
considering that there still are different cultures and people 
with great differences of backgrounds within a culture – and 
of course strong terminological idiosyncrasies. So my 
conclusion is: of course it is a class name.
Naess raises an important issue here. In fact, most of those who associated 
themselves with social ecology and the Institute for Social Ecology always 
saw it as a general viewpoint associated with themes such as ecological 
thinking, economic and political decentralization, alternative technologies, 
social justice and grassroots community.  Bookchin’s own writings were, 
however, increasingly refashioning it into a very specifically defined 
sectarian ideology and politics, which he came to call “dialectical 
naturalism” and “libertarian municipalism.” In fact, Bookchin commented to 
me that most of the contributors to Renewing the Earth, a book dedicated to 
him and his work, didn’t really understand social ecology.  Naess’s remarks 
show that he understood that the book reflected the divergence between my 
effort to preserve pluralism within social ecology, and Bookchin’s developing 
project of ideological entrenchment. 
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In this connection, Naess mentions Bookchin’s concept that the “human 
attempt to dominate nature stems from human domination of other 
humans.” He comments that social ecology develops this concept “within a 
Hegel/Kropotkin philosophical frame of reference,” which he judges to be 
“an excellent frame, and it is to be hoped it will inspire an increasing number 
of people.”  He says that he is not sure, however, whether social ecology 
should be “fixed” to that frame. He observes that it seems to be a larger 
movement “including supporters who either do not understand, or do not 
feel at home with that frame, or people who recognize and respect the frame, 
but feel coerced by an atmosphere of ‘correct’ thinking.” Again, he makes a 
good point concerning diversity within social ecology.  It was disturbing that 
precepts of Bookchin’s own ecophilosophy were perhaps being imposed on a 
more diverse social ecology movement.
Next, he asks, “at institutes of social ecology and other places where social 
ecology is taught, do you discuss the main, pressing problems of the crisis, 
say, the areas discussed in The State of the World 1988 or problem areas as 
listed in the writings of the World Watch Institute or in similar writings with 
world wide distribution?”  Here, he points out a problem with social ecology 
that increasingly troubled me during the period in question.  As a result of 
my interest in a wide spectrum of social and ecological issues and causes, 
and particularly after I became heavily involved in Indonesian, West Papuan 
and East Timorese issues around 1990, I increasingly found Bookchin’s 
version of social ecology to be insular and out of touch with global political, 
economic, and ecological realities. I found that the literature of social ecology 
was focused on ideological debate, on vague, generalized attack and self-
defense, almost to the exclusion of either careful, informed analysis of 
phenomena, or careful, reasoned theoretical reflection.
Finally, Naess poses some important questions about the significance of 
decentralized and organic communities. He says that “especially in the 60s 
many in my circle were heavily influenced by Kropotkin’s Mutual Aid: A 
Factor of Evolution” and that “I found Tönnies’ Gesellschaft und Gemeinschaft 
valuable. . . .” However, he says that he and his colleagues later observed that 
the traditional communities that came closest to the communitarian ideal no 
longer took good care of their environments and that it became clear to them 
that centralized regulation was needed. His conclusion was that “in the years 
to come (30? 60? 100?) we need central authorities and we desperately need 
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to counteract irreparable damage to resources.” He comments, “I wish to 
know where in the world empowerment has not increased ecological 
unsustainability so far.”
This is an area in which greater dialogue would have been useful. Both the 
global justice movement and materialist ecofeminism have shown that there 
is much to learn from indigenous people and women of the global South who 
continue to engage in caring labor that sustains both human community and 
larger ecological communities.11  Though I am not sure to what degree the 
texts I sent to Naess reflect it, this is what I learned from my study of and 
work with the Papuan people in particular.
In a letter of November 9, 1993, Naess writes that he was glad to receive my 
last letter, which, he says, “marks a definite end to my worry about social/
deep ecology.” He included with his letter a 700-word text entitled “Note on 
Social Ecology.” As far as I know, this text has never been published. In it, he 
quotes Bookchin on “first and second nature,” and comments that:
the passage shows how the view “that the ecological crisis… 
stems from  social crisis” is located at the center of “social 
ecology” as Bookchin uses the term.  I permit myself to say 
that one may be a supporter of social ecology even when 
“social crisis” and “to stem from” are taken in a wide sense, 
wider than probably acceptable to Bookchin.  For instance, I 
find it acceptable to say “the ecological problems which the 
ecological crisis raises are really social”.  That biologism – 
and ecologism – ignore the social (including economic and 
technological) factor is clear to me.  We face grave social 
problems.
This is a very important comment. Naess “finds it acceptable” to state 
something that is very much like what Sessions and some other deep 
ecologists have attacked Bookchin and others for saying: that not only is the 
ecological crisis a social crisis, but that one-sidedly ecological views fail to 
address social, economic and technological issues adequately. 
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11 See the important recent work of materialist ecofeminism, Ariel Salleh, ed., Eco-
Sufficiency and Global Justice: Women Write Political Ecology (London and New York: 
Pluto Press, 2009).
Naess then comments that:
As to the ecological sensibility, its high level is a necessary, 
not a sufficient condition.  The majority of a community 
may reach such a level, but economic and other forces may 
nevertheless determine an unecological policy. The 
supporters of the deep ecology movement are supposed not 
only to have that sensibility but to have it intimately related 
to their life philosophy or religiousness. With only people 
with a “pragmatic” leaning, and with rationality defined 
without relation to ultimate view, I disbelieve in a viable 
solution of the crisis.
Here social ecologists would raise questions about whether such an analysis 
strays into ungrounded idealism. The beginning is promising, since Naess 
points out that ecological sensibility is not effective in the face of entrenched 
institutional structures. However, his next point does not address how these 
structures might be changed, but rather the need for relating ecological 
sensibility to deeper-level ultimate values. The idea that change in sensibility 
must be accompanied by change in fundamental values is quite valid. 
However, large numbers of people can achieve certain forms of ecological 
sensibility, and also possess certain ecological ultimate views, but this in 
itself does not necessarily lead to ecological social transformation. The issue 
of the preconditions for effective practice and the crucial question of how 
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pervasive fetishistic disavowal can be overcome obviously need to be 
confronted.12
In December 1993, I received a letter in which Naess replies to questions I 
raised about the Deep Ecology Platform in a (generally sympathetic) review 
of McLaughlin’s book Regarding Nature.13 He says that the review “contains 
some fairly critical sentences about my 8-point proposal of a ‘deep ecology 
platform’ which I have never seen before.  They ought to have been 
announced before . . . . others should already have put them forth if they had 
read the 8-point formulations in an analytically more sensitive mood.” He 
then responds to some of the questions I raise and clarifies certain issues 
about the Deep Ecology Platform. For example, he admits that “the terms 
‘principles’ and ‘platform’ are to some extent misleading,” and that he now 
prefers “the rather long expression ‘set of fairly general views.’” He explains 
that “these views obviously have premises not all of which are ultimate, 
according to the supporters of the views.”   
There is a gap in the letters for over two years, after which Naess writes in a 
letter of February, 1996, that “Some time ago I asked you to tell me what it 
was that you found unacceptable in deep ecology.  Now you have sent a 
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12 “Fetishistic disavowal” is a concept from Lacanian psychoanalysis popularized in 
contemporary social theory by the philosopher Slavoj Zizek.  As a general term in 
social analysis, it refers to a mechanism in which the subject knows something, but 
acts as if he or she did not have such knowledge (epitomized by the French phrase 
“Je sais bien, mais quand même”—“I know very well, but nevertheless.”). 
Classically, in Marx’s analysis of the fetishism of commodities, the well-socialized 
capitalist consumer knows very well that the commodity is merely an object in a 
system of economic exchange, but nevertheless that consumer acts as if the 
commodity had mysterious powers. Similarly, the members of today’s mass society 
increasing know very well that the dominant economic and political order is leading 
the world toward ecological catastrophe, yet nevertheless they act as if they do not 
know this (dutifully voting for representatives of that very order, engaging in 
edifyingly innocuous green consumerism, etc.). 
13 Andrew McLaughlin, Regarding Nature:  Industrialism and Deep Ecology (Albany, 
NY: SUNY Press, 1993).
whole article which I read today.” His quote from page two of the article 
shows that he is referring to my text “How Wide is Deep Ecology?”14 This 
article appeared in 1996 in Inquiry and later in the collection Beneath the 
Surface.  It might be illuminating to cite some of the content of this text at 
length.
In the article, I discuss several major points. First, I point out the value of 
Naess’s "rules of Gandhian nonviolence," which he suggests can be applied 
to theoretical debates in ecophilosophy. Among the principles he 
recommends are the following: "choose that personal action or attitude 
which most probably reduces the tendency towards violence of all parties in 
a struggle”; "fight antagonisms, not antagonists”; "formulate the essential 
interests which [one] and [one's] opponent share and try to cooperate upon 
this basis”; and avoid anything that might "humiliate or provoke [an] 
opponent." 
Secondly, I argue for the basic view of social ecology that ecological crisis can 
only be resolved through confronting social, political and economic realities. 
I note that “there are . . .  billions of people who are de facto reducing 
ecological richness and diversity in order to ‘satisfy’ what are, without 
question, ‘vital needs.’” They are thus doing what is permissible according to 
the Deep Ecology Platform. For this reason, it is necessary to confront “the 
institutional aspects” of the crisis while at the same time recognizing “the 
centrality of ideological, moral, and spiritual transformation.” I contend that 
“to ignore or bracket these [institutional] aspects (as Naess does not do in his 
discussions of his own ecosophy, but as the platform does) will render deep 
ecology superficial . . .”  I point out “that if we want to understand the basis 
for . . .  eco-destruction, we would do well to investigate carefully the 
operation of the world economy, the policies of nation-states, the nature of 
poverty in the [Global] South, systems of land tenure, economic inequalities, 
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14“How Wide is Deep Ecology?” in E. Katz, A. Light and D. Rothenberg, Beneath the 
Surface: Critical Essays in the Philosophy of Deep Ecology (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 
2000), pp. 3-15. 
Third, I contend that Naess's “conception  . . .  of open, constructive dialogue, 
and learning from diverse views . . .  seems to conflict in some ways with a 
perspective that has been encouraged by George Sessions, the main 
American interpreter and historian of deep ecology. Sessions often presents 
deep ecology as presently formulated as being fundamentally beyond 
reproach and implies that any questions raised about its adequacy result 
from either ignorance or malice on the part of critics.  His standpoint toward 
contending ecological viewpoints does not seem to reflect Naess's concern 
with minimizing antagonisms and engagement in open dialogue. Sessions 
seems particularly concerned to depict ecofeminists and social ecologists as 
being in sharp contradiction with the basic ideas of deep ecology. Yet, many 
ecofeminists, social ecologists, and others who take issue with certain 
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positions that Sessions sees as basic to deep ecology would, I believe, have 
little difficulty accepting all the points of the deep ecology platform.”15  
Naess responded to this article with some enthusiasm. He says “I consider it 
a precious gift to my 84th birthday at the end of January.  It is well written 
and so convincing.  I feel sorry for my good friend George Sessions, but can 
only very weakly object to your description of his role in recent debates.”
In response to my discussion of the preconditions for transformation, he says 
that “clearly, [the eight points of the Platform] do not specify a center of 
attention: ‘What are we to do in order to overcome the ecological crisis? 
Which must be our priorities?’ Here social ecology suggests an answer, and 
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15In sections of the article that were cut before publication, I raised issues about the 
concept of biospheric egalitarianism. I mention that Naess states that "when forced 
to choose, he ‘unhesitatingly and deliberately’ steps on the Salix herbacea rather than 
‘the small, more overwhelmingly beautiful and rarer Gentiana nivalis,’” and I 
observe that “it would be hard to imagine what would indicate recognition of a 
greater right to life for one organism than another more than the decision to destroy 
one in preference to the other.” I also point out that in “Deep Ecology in the Line of 
Fire” Naess says that the expression “biospheric egalitarianism” means only that all 
beings are equal in that they all have intrinsic value and "does not even logically 
imply that the intrinsicness has degrees or does not admit degrees.’” [Arne Naess, 
“Deep Ecology in the Line of Fire” in The Trumpeter: Journal of Ecosophy, 12:3 (1995) 
http://trumpeter.athabascau.ca/index.php/trumpet/article/view/307/460.] He 
also states, in a discussion of human suffering caused by sleeping sickness, that "the 
flagellate Trypanosoma gambiensis" has "an unfathomable complexity of structure, 
but we recognize the human being as a still higher order of complexity." [Arne 
Naess, “Systemization of Logically Ultimate Norms and Hypotheses of Ecosophy T” 
in Alan Drengson and Yuichi Inoue, The Deep Ecology Movement: An Introductory 
Anthology (Berkeley, CA.: North Atlantic Books, 1995),  pp. 38-39.] I observe that 
although his point is that protecting the human can be defended using the norm of 
"complexity!" that his analysis raises questions about any non-rhetorical force of his 
biospheric egalitarianism principle.
also ecofeminism. Both suggest basic causal factors leading to the crisis, and 
each suggests a main direction of fight to reach ecological sustainability and 
social justice. (Very important views belonging to level 3 in my "Apron 
Diagram.")  And social justice is thought to be implied.” Thus, he recognizes 
these views as “important.” But does he accept the case?
As I read him, he finds my article “convincing” but he has not quite been 
convinced. He continues: “As I see it, a minimum of social justice is implied, 
but one of my sinister scenarios is a development of the Third World in the 
direction of Western consumerism.  This may result in a sort of social justice, 
but ensures ecological catastrophe and opens the door for authoritarian 
regimes?” But does this concern really relate to the position of social 
ecology? The contention of social ecology (and also of materialist 
ecofeminism and ecosocialism) is that meaningful social justice cannot be 
attained through a mere reform of global capitalism. Any form of social 
transformation that leaves “Western consumerism” not only intact but 
continuing its expansion to every corner of the global would signal the 
complete failure of the programs of these ecophilosophies.
In a letter of January, 1997, Naess showed himself to be quite open to 
possible evidence for connecting social domination and the domination of 
nature. He says that “What might be called Murray Bookchin’s domination 
hypothesis has interested me since the 60’s, but I am not acquainted with 
historical studies that confirm a relation between the level of domination 
people/people and people/nature.  I am sure some social ecologists could 
help me.  I would be grateful to you if you could bring me into contact with 
those who have studied that relation.”  Despite his optimism about the 
existence of such studies, I never found Bookchin or those who supported 
his view to be interested in careful analysis of the evidence. However, shortly 
I would send him my own analysis of the issue.
Naess also seemed very open to including concern about social domination 
in the platform. He suggests that “the wording of point 6 [of the Platform] 
should be changed for instance by adding ‘in order to diminish and 
ultimately to eliminate human domination over humans (person/person and 
group/group domination)’” and he asks whether “Point 7 is perhaps too 
closely connected with the problematics of rich countries and the prevailing 
efforts to reach a level and kind of consumption of rich countries. It could 
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stress the importance of communities with absence of domination.” He 
suggests that “perhaps the level and areas of human domination over 
humans could by gigantic social and political efforts be significantly reduced 
within three generations.  But without direct activism against ecological 
unsustainability the situation in the year 2100 will presumably be extremely 
serious, and the same holds good if we give up work to influence countries 
or areas where certain forms of human domination over humans are 
extreme.”  
Naess thus seems to be moving toward a greater recognition of the 
importance of the question of domination to the issue of ecological crisis. 
However, he does not really respond to the core of the social ecology 
position.  To state this position rather starkly: there will be no solution to the 
ecological crisis without a solution to the problem of social domination. And 
we do not have three generations to find a solution to the ecological crisis.
In my next letter, in early August, 1997, I tried to address this question of 
domination more clearly. I said that I had written a long analysis of George 
Sessions' Deep Ecology for the 21st Century,16  and included a section on the 
question of domination. This section, along with about half of the entire text, 
was cut in the published version in The Trumpeter.17 I mentioned that he was 
the first to see it other than the editor, David Rothenberg. That section goes as 
follows:
Some deep ecologists have criticized ecofeminists for 
holding that the source of domination of nature is found in 
patriarchal domination of men over women, and have 
attacked social ecologists for holding that the domination of 
nature is rooted in the domination of humans by other 
humans. [For example,] Warwick Fox argues against 
ecofeminists and social ecologists “that ‘it is possible to 
imagine a society that has realized social, racial, and gender 
equality, but is still ecologically exploitative.’" This 
argument supposedly refutes the contention by advocates of 
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these two viewpoints that the solution to ecological 
problems is the overcoming of domination in human society 
(whether this domination is essentially patriarchal, or 
essentially a system of various interrelated forms of 
domination).
Fox's argument is based on a misunderstanding of certain aspects of social 
ecology and ecofeminism.  First, neither theory is based on an ideal of social 
equality, and, in fact both would question this liberal, often economistic 
conception.  But more fundamentally, the criticism overlooks the view of 
these theories that domination in society and domination of nature are 
dialectically interrelated.  Bookchin writes of an "epistemology of rule" and 
Karen Warren of the "logic of domination," concepts that do not refer 
exclusively to relations between groups of humans, but rather to a 
comprehensive system of values and a peculiar sensibility.  Thus, they 
address the quality of the whole of human experience. The kind of 
revolutionizing of values and sensibility envisioned by these theories could 
hardly be limited to certain social realms and have no implications for our 
attitude to nature.  To assume this possibility suggests a certain 
psychological naïveté, a failure to consider the holistic nature of the psyche, 
or a misunderstanding of the transformative projects of these theories. In any 
case, while it is true that in unreflective consciousness, compassionate and 
destructive attitudes to the other can easily coexist, theories that call for 
fundamental reflection on the nature of domination and objectification seek 
to uncover exactly such contradictions.  !
Social ecology does not accept the simplistic division between realms of 
domination that Fox attributes to it.  As a philosophy of dialectical holism, it 
studies human society as part of the natural world in constant interaction 
and mutual determination with the rest of the natural world.  Overcoming 
human domination means coming to grips with the problem of domination 
by humans in nature--for there can be no humans dominating other humans 
in society somewhere outside of nature.  For an authentic social ecology, 
there is no dualistic division between the domination of nature by humans 
and the domination of humans by humans.  We are nature, and thus any 
form of domination is immediately a form of domination of nature.  It is 
therefore impossible to reflect critically on any form of domination without 
confronting the issue of domination of nature.  Furthermore, such dualistic 
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projects as the domination of mind over body, of male over female, of 
civilized over primitive, and so forth are conceived in each case by the 
dominating consciousness itself as a kind of domination of nature, since that 
which is dominated is invariably assimilated into or reduced to nature. 
Thus, given the nature of the existing social imaginary, it is impossible to 
reflect on many traditional ideologies of domination without directly 
confronting the problem of the domination of nature.
I conclude by agreeing that Bookchin has not adequately defended his 
position, and noting that his view was in fact quite undialectical, but arguing 
that a stronger social ecological position exists that might be the focus of 
discussion.
In his reply of the same month, August, 1997, Naess begins with the slightly 
cryptic comment that “I have always been sure that you would send me a 
letter, and yesterday I received just what I wanted.” Presumably he meant a 
letter on the issue of domination, which was an ongoing theoretical interest 
for him. 
He comments that he has attempted to initiate dialogue with Bookchin, but 
that little has come out of it. I believe that he was referring to the fact that 
Bookchin was invited to contribute to the volume Philosophical Dialogues: 
Arne Naess and the Progress of Ecophilosophy.18  Unfortunately, instead of 
writing an article engaging in dialogue, Bookchin chose instead to send the 
inflammatory “Social Ecology versus Deep Ecology” in almost exactly the 
form that it had appeared over a decade before. Bookchin’s text is followed 
by very brief responses by Naess and Andrew McLaughlin.
The collection also included Naess’s conciliatory “Unanswered Letter 
to Murray Bookchin, 1988.” In that letter, Naess expresses his “conviction 
that deep changes of ‘economic, technological, and ideological structures’ are 
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18Witosek, Nina, and Brennan, Andrew, eds. Philosophical Dialogues: Arne Naess and 
the Progress of Ecophilosophy (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999).
required to radically change policies towards nature.”19  In other words, he 
asserts that change in social relations is a precondition for change in the 
relation between humanity and nature. Thus, even if he ignored entirely 
Naess’s published writings, Bookchin knew almost a decade earlier that the 
gap between his own position and that of Naess was far narrower than he 
pretended.  
In Naess’s letter to me he reiterates his ongoing concern about how we might 
prevent the disputes among radical ecologists from being used to discredit 
the whole movement. He concludes with the comment that he is "Sorry that 
we have not met each other considering the many interests we have in 
common." This is something that I now regret very much.
In what I believe to be my last letter to Naess (August 20, 1997), I conclude 
with what I see as common ground between my conception of social ecology 
and some aspects of deep ecology. I comment on my efforts:
to synthesize the dialectical and teleological tradition of 
Western thought with an Eastern critique of the self and 
identity coming from Nagarjuna, Taoism and Zen. Perhaps 
this is not possible, but I see the confrontation between these 
traditions as necessary and creative.  I differ from Bookchin 
on dialectic in that he uses it to produce a "result" that is 
more reifiable, positive, and self-identical than I think 
possible.  I take theoretical results in a more ironic, tentative, 
provisional way (to use inadequate terminology). I would 
stress the dynamic, self-transforming, critical, negating 
aspects of dialectic more than Bookchin.  
Our reality must be seen as part of the "whole," but this whole is (as I think 
D. T. Suzuki put it) "an ever-becoming whole" for which our concepts always 
seek to "stop the movement," or achieve the impossible dream of one-sided 
rationalism. My idea of dialectic is not, like Bookchin's, to discover the 
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"latent potentialities" in everything or to uncover the privileged 
"directionality" of phenomena, but rather to "think the movement"—to 
express our immersion in that ever-becoming wholeness. But on the other 
side, what is just as important is that we need to express our appreciation of 
what is attained in this process: the beauty, goodness, sacredness of the 
phenomenon . . . . The dialectical holism that I'm working toward would also 
I think synthesize some of the seemingly conflicting approaches of deep and 
social ecologists.  
In the last letter I received from Arne Naess, dated Aug. 27, 1997, he says: “I 
am now completely at ease about the deep ecology/social ecology relations.” 
He remarks that “‘The frontier is long!’ and we need supporters of the deep 
ecology movement and we need social ecologists. As activists we do different 
things, and may differ in priorities. But, as I see it, there are not two 
conflicting approaches. You may, and others may, feel that the approaches are 
not only different, but conflicting. This does not make me sad at all. And we 
shall avoid biased descriptions of each other's views.”
Actually, his suspicions were correct, and infected as I am by dialectical 
thinking, I believe that they are conflicting, but they are also not conflicting, 
both conflicting and not conflicting, and neither conflicting nor not 
conflicting.  Accordingly, I am very grateful that Arne Naess was with us to 
speak for the important truth of non-conflict. I am also sorry that his more 
subtle view was overwhelmed by certain louder and more manic partisans of 
conflict, and, finally, that we have not been able to move more quickly 
beyond both conflict and non-conflict to a deeper level of dialogue and 
dialectic. 
Postscript
Naess’s hopes for respectful dealings between social and deep ecologists 
were unrealized not only because of Bookchin’s obsessive vendetta. George 
Sessions, in “Wildness, Cyborgs, and Our Ecological Future: Reassessing the 
Deep Ecology Movement”20 was still as late as 2006 presenting the saddest 
parodies of other ecophilosophies. Referring to “contemporary 
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ecophilosophers, environmental ethicists, and environmental historians,” 
and “the social ecologists, ecofeminists, and Callicott with his Leopoldian 
ethic,” he charges that “these contemporary ecophilosophers and 
environmental ethicists have generally paid little attention . . . to the world’s 
scientists’ increasingly dire warnings about the global ecological crisis,” 
something that many of them have been stressing for decades. He says that I 
believe that the most distinctive claim of social ecology is that “the human 
urge to dominate nature . . . results above all from human domination of 
other humans,” which is in fact a view that I have criticized as being too 
simplistic. He also refers to my “attempts to defend social ecology’s 
anthropocentrism,” although I have attempted to show it to be non-
anthropocentric in significant ways. He says that I now consider myself a 
“deep social ecologist,” although in fact this is not my term but one used by 
Bookchin to attack me.  He says I “now claim to support bioregionalism,” 
although in fact I co-founded an early bioregional magazine21 over twenty 
years ago, and have been close to the movement over all that time.  He says I 
now “apparently support Ken Wilber’s anthropocentric Hegelian 
spirituality,” “apparently” because I am a friend and colleague of Michael 
Zimmerman, who is a proponent of Wilber’s ideas. Finally, he states that I 
have “more recently . . .  sought strong ties with ecofeminism,” although in 
fact I have supported and written in support of ecofeminism for decades. 
Because of my suspect sympathies for ecofeminism, he questions whether I 
might also be a supporter of the “Cyborg Manifesto,” something no 
ecofeminist I know has supported or even seen as being of particular 
interest. In the end, he dismisses social ecologists, including me, and 
ecofeminists in general, for “academic ‘game playing’ and political power 
trips involving a ‘jockeying for position’ which has basically obfuscated the 
issues and delayed realistic solutions to the ecological crisis.”  I can only 
conclude that the kind of constructive dialogue championed by Arne Naess 
is needed now as much as ever.
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